Disclosure Summary
On February 6, 2026, the OpenClaw security team received a responsible disclosure report from an independent security researcher identifying a critical vulnerability in "DataBridge," one of the most widely installed skills on the ClawHub marketplace. The vulnerability, now tracked as CVE-2026-1847, allowed a specially crafted input payload to bypass the skill's sandboxing protections and gain unauthorized read access to the host system's environment variables. In the worst case, this could have exposed API keys, database credentials, and other sensitive configuration data stored in the environment of an OpenClaw operator's deployment.
Within 12 hours of receiving the report, the OpenClaw security team had confirmed the vulnerability, notified the skill's maintainer, and issued a temporary advisory recommending that all DataBridge users disable the skill pending a patch. A fix was published to ClawHub within 36 hours of the initial report, and all affected users were notified through ClawHub's automated update system. As of this writing, there is no evidence that the vulnerability was exploited in the wild prior to disclosure.
The OpenClaws.io Team wants to use this incident as an opportunity to be transparent about what happened, how we responded, and what we are doing to prevent similar issues in the future.
Technical Details
The vulnerability resided in DataBridge's input parsing module, which was responsible for processing structured data from external sources and making it available to OpenClaw agents. The module used a custom deserialization routine that, under specific conditions, failed to properly sanitize input containing embedded shell metacharacters. When an agent processed a maliciously crafted data payload, the deserialization routine would inadvertently pass unsanitized strings to a subprocess call, enabling a limited form of command injection.
The sandbox escape was possible because DataBridge had been granted elevated permissions during its ClawHub review process. The skill's stated functionality — bridging data between external APIs and OpenClaw agents — required access to network resources and certain system-level operations. The review team had approved these permissions based on a thorough code review at the time of submission. However, a subsequent update to the skill introduced the vulnerable deserialization code, and the incremental review process did not catch the regression.
It is important to note that the vulnerability was constrained by several factors. First, it required the attacker to control or manipulate the external data source that DataBridge was configured to consume. Second, the command injection was limited to read operations — the attacker could not write to the filesystem or execute arbitrary programs. Third, OpenClaw's default security configuration limits the environment variables visible to skills, which would have reduced the impact for operators who had not modified the default settings.
Timeline of Events
The following timeline documents the key events from initial discovery to resolution:
- •February 6, 08:14 UTC: Security researcher submits vulnerability report through OpenClaw's responsible disclosure program.
- •February 6, 09:30 UTC: OpenClaw security team acknowledges receipt and begins triage.
- •February 6, 14:22 UTC: Vulnerability confirmed and classified as Critical (CVSS 8.6).
- •February 6, 15:00 UTC: DataBridge maintainer notified via secure channel.
- •February 6, 16:45 UTC: Temporary advisory published; ClawHub flags DataBridge with a security warning.
- •February 6, 20:30 UTC: DataBridge maintainer submits initial patch for review.
- •February 7, 03:15 UTC: Security team identifies additional edge case in initial patch; requests revision.
- •February 7, 14:00 UTC: Revised patch submitted and approved after comprehensive testing.
- •February 7, 20:00 UTC: Patched version (DataBridge v2.4.1) published to ClawHub.
- •February 7, 20:15 UTC: Automated notifications sent to all DataBridge users recommending immediate update.
- •February 8, 10:00 UTC: Public security advisory published with full technical details.
Community Response
The community's response to this incident has been exemplary. Within hours of the initial advisory, several experienced community members volunteered to audit other high-permission skills on ClawHub for similar vulnerabilities. This ad-hoc security review, which eventually involved over 40 contributors, examined the 100 most-installed skills and identified three additional instances of potentially unsafe deserialization patterns, none of which rose to the level of an exploitable vulnerability but all of which were flagged for remediation.
The DataBridge maintainer's response was equally commendable. They were transparent about the error, responsive to the security team's feedback, and proactive in communicating with their users. In a post on the OpenClaw forum, they provided a detailed post-mortem explaining how the vulnerable code was introduced and what steps they were taking to prevent similar issues in the future.
Lessons Learned and Policy Changes
This incident has prompted several concrete changes to ClawHub's security processes. We want to share these openly so that the community understands what we are doing and can hold us accountable.
First, we are strengthening the incremental review process for skill updates. Previously, updates to existing skills underwent a lighter review than initial submissions. Going forward, any update that modifies code in security-sensitive areas — including input parsing, network communication, and system calls — will trigger a full security review equivalent to the initial submission process.
Second, we are introducing automated static analysis scanning for all skill submissions and updates. This scanning will check for common vulnerability patterns, including unsafe deserialization, command injection, path traversal, and other OWASP-classified risks. While automated scanning cannot catch every vulnerability, it provides an important additional layer of defense.
Third, we are implementing a more granular permission model for skills. Rather than granting broad categories of access, skills will need to request specific, narrowly scoped permissions. For example, instead of requesting general "network access," a skill will need to specify which domains it intends to communicate with. This principle of least privilege will reduce the potential impact of future vulnerabilities.
Fourth, we are expanding our responsible disclosure program with a formal bug bounty. Security researchers who identify and responsibly disclose vulnerabilities in ClawHub skills or the OpenClaw core framework will be eligible for financial rewards commensurate with the severity of their findings.
Recommendations for Operators
In light of this incident, we recommend that all OpenClaw operators take the following steps to strengthen their security posture. Review the permissions granted to installed ClawHub skills and revoke any that are not strictly necessary. Ensure that sensitive credentials are stored in a dedicated secrets manager rather than in environment variables directly accessible to the OpenClaw process. Enable ClawHub's automatic update feature to ensure that security patches are applied promptly. And monitor the OpenClaw security advisory feed for future notifications.
The OpenClaws.io Team takes the security of the ecosystem seriously. No software is immune to vulnerabilities, but we are committed to responding quickly, transparently, and decisively when issues arise. We thank the security researcher who reported this vulnerability and the community members who contributed to the response.